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STEPS TOWARDS AND ALIGNMENT OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN SOUTH-SOUTH EXCHANGES: A RETURN TO TRIPS 
Ana Santos Rutschman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some of the most instrumental players in shaping the course of intellectual 
property policies in the South are the so-called BRIC countries.1  The acronym 
BRIC originally encompassed Brazil, Russia, India and China.  In 2011, South 
Africa formally joined the BRIC countries, which are now referred to either by the 
original acronym or by BRICS.2  While categorizations like BRICS attract a fair 
amount of criticism, with questions surrounding the criteria used to aggregate 
disparate economies,3 the concept of emerging economies in the Global South 
seeking to advance similar development agendas has become accepted currency in 
multiple fields, from institutional cooperation to financial analysis and 
investment.4 
 
* Innovation Fellow at the Innovation and Technology Lab, Duke University. 
 1.  See JIM O’NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE BRICS AND BEYOND 
(2011); Robert C. Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Emerging BRIC Economies: Lessons from Intellectual 
Property Negotiation and Enforcement, 5(3) NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 400 (2007) (giving an 
analysis of the role of intellectual property norms in BRIC countries). 
 2.  A more recent construct is that of MINT countries, which comprise Mexico, Indonesia, 
Nigeria and Turkey. These are densely populated, strategically located developing countries with 
promising recent and prospective economic growth patterns.  See Jim O’Neill, Who You Calling a 
BRIC?, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 12, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-
11-12/who-you-calling-a-bric-; Kyle Caldwell, How to invest in the ‘Mint’ emerging markets, 
TELEGRAPH, (Jan. 17, 2014, 7:58 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/10580108/How-to-invest-in-the-Mint-
emerging-markets.html (showing a survey of the use of the acronym MINT in the press and in 
colloquial discourse); Jackie Northam, The Global Economy: A World Of Acronyms, NPR (May 13, 
2014, 3:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/05/13/311852601/the-global-economy-will-
mint-countries-be-the-new-brics. 
 3.  This has been particularly evident in the case of MINT countries.  See Roger Bootle, The 
MINTs are Very Different and Might not All See Stellar Growth, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 12, 2014, 8:07 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/rogerbootle/10567196/Roger-Bootle-The-MINTs-are-
very-different-and-might-not-all-see-stellar-growth.html; Carolyn Cohn, BRIC or MINT? Investors 
Suffer Acronym Anxiety, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2014, 7:04 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/ 2014/01/20/ 
emerging-investment -acronyms-idINDEEA0J0DD20140120.  Even if flawed, artificial categorizations 
may actually yield some benefits for some of the targeted countries.  For instance, in the case of 
Nigeria, which is the only MINT country that is not a member of the G20, it has been pointed out that 
the creation of the acronym could generate enough pressure for Nigeria to join the group.  The Mint 
countries: Next economic giants?, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE (Jan. 5, 2014, 19:36 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25548060.   
 4.  Since 2009, the BRICS hold an annual summit.  See VI BRICS SUMMIT: MINISTRY OF 
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Since the first BRIC summit in 2009, the range of areas on which the BRICS 
cooperate or plan to cooperate has expanded considerably.5  One of the issue areas 
that gained increasing attention from BRICS policy-makers is intellectual property.  
This has been particularly true since 2013, when these countries signed their first 
agreement on cooperation between intellectual property offices.6  The agreement, 
known as the Roadmap, focuses primarily on cooperation in patent matters, and 
has the potential to trigger an alignment of patent policies in the South—or, more 
accurately, in the most economically-empowered arenas of the South. 
As the Roadmap comes into force, this article explores options for further 
cooperation between BRICS—and, potentially, developing countries in general—
beyond the patent field.  It begins by noting that patent law, in the form of 
flexibilities within the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement” or “TRIPS”),7 has consistently been at the 
heart of the boldest and most controversial intellectual property measures adopted 
by some of the leading economies of the South.8  It then describes the main 
features of the recent Roadmap, with an emphasis on its patent-centric design.  The 
article proceeds to propose a set of TRIPS-compatible measures outside patent law 
that countries seeking to advance development agendas have yet to explore.  In an 
era in which post-TRIPS and post-World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
approaches9 often relegate treaty interpretation to a residual position, these 
 
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, http://www.brics6.itamaraty.gov.br (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); Katy Watson, 
Brics Summit: Banking on a New Global Order, BBC NEWS (July 13, 2014 19:01), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28235378.  In 2014, the BRICS established a multilateral 
development bank, the New Development Bank, headquartered in Shanghai.  Agreement on the New 
Development Bank- Fortaleza, July 15, VI BRICS SUMMIT MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL REL. (July 15, 
2014), http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/press-releases/219-agreement-on-the-new-development-
bank-fortaleza-july-15; Raj M. Desai & James Raymond Vreeland, What the New Bank of BRICS is All 
About, WASH. POST (July 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/07/17/what-the-new-bank-of-brics-is-all-about/. 
 5.  Compare the Joint Statement produced in the 2009 summit with the Action Plans that 
emerged from the 2013 and 2014 summit.  First Summit: Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries 
Leaders, VI BRICS SUMMIT MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL REL. (June 16, 2009), 
http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/114-first-summit-2.  The 2013 
Declaration and Action Plan established the creation of the BRICS Development Bank, which would 
eventually become the New Development Bank.  Fifth Summit: eThekwini Declaration and Action 
Plan, VI BRICS SUMMIT MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL REL. (Mar. 27, 2013), 
http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/69-fifth-summit; Sixth Summit: Fortaleza 
Declaration and Action Plan, VI BRICS SUMMIT MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL REL. (July 15, 2014), 
http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/223-sixth-summit-declaration-and-action-
plan. 
 6.  BRICS TRADE AND INVESTMENT COOPERATION FRAMEWORK, art 4.5 (2013), 
http://www.brics5.co.za/assets/BRICS-Trade-and-Investment-Cooperation-Framework.pdf [hereinafter 
COOPERATION FRAMEWORK]; William New, BRICS Launch Their Own Plan for IP Cooperation; India 
Defends Itself, IP WATCH, (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/11/27/brics-launch-their-
own-plan-for-ip-cooperation-india-defends-itself/. 
 7.  Specifically, the flexibilities associated with compulsory licensing.  
 8.  This would be the case of Brazil and India, who paved the way for compulsory licensing of 
patented drugs, thus bolstering the development of domestic generics markets. 
 9.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 Apr. 1994, 
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measures are derived from TRIPS and have the potential to further the innovation 
agendas of developing countries without increasing the overall levels of domestic 
intellectual property protection. 
II. CONTOURS OF A PROGRESSIVE ALIGNMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FROM 
COMPULSORY LICENSING IN THE BRICS TO THE 2013 ROADMAP 
A.  An Overview of Compulsory Licensing in the BRICS 
So far, the greatest intellectual property showdowns between the South and 
the North have taken place in the patent field, specifically in the pharmaceutical 
arena, with generics being at the center of most political and legal disputes.10 
Tensions between manufacturers of patented drugs in the North and generic 
industries11 fueled the first years of TRIPS implementation and continue to the 
present day, amid trade threats12 and WTO disputes.13  Unsurprisingly, several of 
the BRICS have been at the center of these controversies.  India, which grew a 
globally competitive generics industry by not recognizing pharmaceutical patents 
for several decades after 1972, finally amended its patent law in 2005 to comply 
with TRIPS obligations.14  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, South Africa 
underwent a long war with manufacturers of patented drugs in an effort to curb its 
AIDS epidemics.15  Today, South Africa is revising its intellectual property laws to 
 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 10.  See Enrico Bonadio & Carlo Maria Cantore, Seizures of In-Transit Generics at the EU 
Borders: India and Brazil v. The EU, 1 EUR. J. RISK REG. 404, 404-408 (2010); Robert Ineson et al., 
U.S. Retaliates After Thai, Brazilian Decisions on Pharmaceutical IP, IHS (July 4, 2007), 
https://www.ihs.com/country-industry-forecasting.html?ID=106597914;.Compulsory License 
Application No. 1 of 2011, Application for Compulsory License under Section 84(1) of the Patents Act, 
1970 in respect of Patent No.215758 (Natco Pharma Limited v. Bayer Corp.) C.L.A. No. 1 of 2011 
(2012) [hereinafter Natco], http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/compulsory_license_12032012.pdf.  The 
Special 301 Reports issued yearly by the Office of the United States Trade Representative also attest to 
the ideological tensions between patent policies in the South (and, in particular, within the BRICS) and 
the United States.  See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411  
 11.  See Amir Attaran, How Do Patents And Economic Policies Affect Access To Essential 
Medicines In Developing Countries?, 23 HEALTH AFF. 155, 155-166 (2004) (discussing the role that 
patents play in access to medicines throughout the South); David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic 
Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 37 (2005) (discussing structural relationships within 
the generics industries); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug 
Patents?, 8 (4) J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613 (2011) (discussing an econometric analysis of post-
Hatch-Waxman Act competition between the generic industry and brand-name manufacturers of drugs). 
 12.  See, e.g., Robert Ineson et al., supra note 10. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent 
System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (2007); Shamnad 
Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act 2005, 1 INDIAN J. L. & TECH. 1 
(2005); Brenda Waning et al., A Lifeline to Treatment: The Role of Indian Generic Manufacturers in 
Supplying Antiretroviral Medicines to Developing Countries, 13 J. INT. AIDS SOCIETY 35 (2010). 
 15.  David Barnard, In the High Court of South Africa, Case No. 4138/98: The Global Politics of 
Access to Low-Cost AIDS Drugs in Poor Countries, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 159 (2002); WILLIAM 
W. FISHER III & DR. CYRILL P. RIGAMONTI, THE SOUTH AFRICA AIDS CONTROVERSY A CASE STUDY 
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position itself as a leader in generic drug manufacturing.16 
Brazil is often credited with being the savviest of developing countries in 
playing the “court of public opinion” to jump-start the generics industry.17  In 
1997, a local working requirement was incorporated into Brazilian domestic patent 
law.18  In 1999, Brazil passed legislation enabling compulsory licensing for non-
commercial public uses of patents in cases of national emergency and public 
interest.19  While these legislative reforms were applicable to all fields of 
technology, Brazil took advantage of the ongoing debate surrounding the AIDS 
patents in South Africa to tie its patent reform both to AIDS crisis and, more 
broadly, to the claims of access to medicines movements around the developing 
world.20  Brazil’s careful framing of the situation, which at one point acquired 
human rights contours, succeeded in breaking resistance from the North, with the 
United States dropping a WTO complaint about the Brazilian patent reform.21 
India, which took significantly longer to grant compulsory licenses, faced the 
same kind of international pressure when it issued its first license.  In 2012, the 
Controller of Patents in Mumbai approved compulsory licensing of Nexavar, a 
drug patented by Bayer.22  Prompt response from the United States framed the 
approval as an undue restriction of intellectual property rights: 
India’s decision in this case to restrict patent rights of an innovator 
based, in part, on the innovator’s decision to import its products, rather 
than manufacture them in India, establishes a troubling precedent.  
Unless overturned, the decision could potentially compel innovators 
outside India—including those in sectors well beyond pharmaceuticals, 
such as green technology and information and communications 
technology—to manufacture in India in order to avoid being forced to 
license an invention to third parties.23 
India’s first foray into compulsory licensing has contributed to the decision to 
 
IN PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2005), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf. 
 16.  Tiisetso Motsoeneng, South Africa Slams Big Pharma in Generic Drugs Row, REUTERS (Jan. 
17, 2014 6:57 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/17/us-safrica-pharma-
idUSBREA0G0N720140117. 
 17. The Emerging BRIC Economies, supra note 1, at 407. 
 18.  Id. at 406. 
 19.  Decree No. 3.201 of October 6, 1999 (Compulsory Licenses in Cases of National Emergency 
and Public Interest), WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=516 (last visited Feb. 9, 
2015). 
 20.  The Emerging BRIC Economies, supra note 1, at 407; Jane Galvão, Brazil and Access to 
HIV/AIDS Drugs: A Question of Human Rights and Public Health, 95 (7) AM J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1110, 
1110–13 (July 2005); Pascual Ortells, Brazil: A Model Response to AIDS, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (April 
2003), https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/211/44923.html; Claudia Jurberg; 
Brazil Declares Patented AIDS Drug of Public Interest, Could Expand Access, IP WATCH (Apr. 22, 
2008), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=1015. 
 21.  See Chakravarthi Raghavan, US Beats a (Tactical) Retreat over Brazil’s Patent Law, THIRD 
WORLD NETWORK (June 25, 2001), http://www.twn.my/title/tactical.htm. 
 22. Natco, supra note 10 art 15. 
 23.  OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), 2013 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 39 (2013), 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/05012013%202013%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf.  
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keep the country on the higher level of the U.S. 301 Watch List (priority watch).24  
Brazil, on the other hand, has moved from the priority watch list to the lower 
category (watch list).25 
Among the other BRICS, China amended its law in 2012 to enable 
compulsory licensing of generics,26 but so far no use has been made of the new 
provisions.27  Similarly, Russian patent law contemplates the possibility of 
compulsory licensing, but there are no reports of any activity as to its progress.28  
Protection of pharmaceuticals is therefore moving towards alignment among the 
BRICS group.29  All founding BRIC countries have compulsory licensing schemes 
in place, albeit the regimes differ slightly from one country to another.30  South 
Africa is in the process of amending its patent to bring it more into consonance 
with practices in the other leading economies of the developing world.31 
Even outside the BRICS zone, compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals has 
been expanding.  One of the most well-known cases is Thailand, which issued a 
compulsory license for Efavirenz, a drug used in the treatment of HIV, in 2006.32  
There has also been compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals throughout different 
regions of the Global South, from Indonesia and Malaysia to the Dominican 
Republic, to Ghana and Mozambique, to name a few examples.33 
As TRIPS reaches the end of its second decade of existence,34 the most 
prominent point of convergence of intellectual property policies in the South has 
revolved around compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals.  This convergence does 
not appear to result from concerted efforts among developing countries (or even 
 
 24.  Id. at 6.  Since 1989, the USTR has enacted annual Section 301 Special Reports, identifying 
countries that do not effectively protect intellectual property rights.  Countries with intellectual property 
violations considered particularly serious (in the optic of the USTR) are placed under a Priority Watch 
List, whereas countries of concern but deemed less problematic are placed in the Watch List. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Lynne Taylor, China Amends Patent Laws to Enable Compulsory Licensing, PHARMA TIMES 
DIGITAL (June 3, 2012), http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/12-06-
13/China_amends_patent_laws_to_enable_compulsory_licensing.aspx. 
 27.  Although, in 2005, China’s threats to issue a compulsory license eventually led to voluntary 
licenses for the manufacture of generic versions of Tamiflu.  JAMES PACKARD LOVE, RECENT 
EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSES ON PATENTS 12 (2007), 
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls.pdf.  
 28.  Maria Nilova & Vadim Chagin, A Changing Landscape: Life Sciences in Russia, WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. REV. (May 1, 2012), http://www.worldipreview.com/article/a-changing-landscape-life-
sciences-in-russia. 
 29. The Emerging BRIC Economies, supra note 1, at 416. 
 30.  Id. at 420. 
 31.  Lynne Taylor, S Africa Pledges Action on Compulsory Licenses, Parallel Imports, PHARMA 
TIMES DIGITAL, (Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.pharmatimes.com/Article/13-11-
07/S_Africa_pledges_action_on_compulsory_licenses_parallel_imports.aspx. 
 32.  See Robert Steinbrook, Thailand and the Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz, 356 N. ENGL. J. 
MED. 544 , 544 (Feb. 8, 2007). 
 33.  See JAMES PACKARD LOVE, supra note 27. 
 34.  Nearly a decade and a half has passed since WTO members adopted the Doha Declaration.  
See DOHA WTO Ministerial 2001, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, (Nov. 14, 2001). 
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amidst the BRICS), but rather from an informal alignment of policies (and politics) 
surrounding a highly sensitive area.  The situation may soon change; however, the 
intellectual property offices of the BRICS have recently signed a cooperation 
agreement to exchange best practices and potentially align their domestic 
intellectual property procedures and policies. 
B.  The 2013 Roadmap: Alignment of Polices in the Patent Field 
At the 2012 BRICS Summit, held in Durban, South Africa, the trade ministers 
of the BRICS endorsed a Trade and Investment Cooperation Framework,35 which 
was signed in March 2013.  This agreement establishes an “open-ended and 
progressive”36 framework with the primary purpose of “[p]romoting trade, 
investment and economic cooperation” among BRICS members.37  While 
intellectual property is not the only target of this trade-centric framework, 
cooperation in “high technology areas”38 and on IP rights is prominently 
endorsed.39 
As a consequence, in May 2013, the intellectual property offices of the BRIC 
countries agreed on an Intellectual Property Cooperation Roadmap (“Roadmap”) 
in Magaliesburg, South Africa, seeking “to enhance cooperation between the 
respective BRICS IP offices with a view to enhancing the value of IP and to ensure 
its contribution to the economic development and growth in the member 
countries.”40 
A reading of the prongs of the Roadmap indicates that its main focus is 
patentable innovation.  The agreement identifies the following “cooperation 
streams:” 
1. Training of Intellectual Property Office Staff 
2. IP/Patent processes and procedures including search, 
classification and translation 
 
 35.  Cooperation Framework, supra note 6. 
 36.  Id. art. 2.2. 
 37.  Id. art. 3.1. 
 38.  Id. art. 4.3.1. 
 39.  Article 4 of the Cooperation Framework, entitled “Areas of Work,” expressly contemplate 
inter-BRICS cooperation to promote innovation (4.3) and to enhance information exchange and 
capacity building in the intellectual property field (4.5): 
4.3 Innovation Cooperation: 4.3.1 Establishing project platforms to promote communication 
and cooperation in high- technology areas.  4.3.2 Encouraging the expansion of trade and 
investment in high value-added products.  4.3.3 Advancing dialogue and communications in 
emerging industries, and promoting trade and investment in industries that are technology-, 
knowledge-, or capital- intensive. [4.4 omitted]  4.5 Cooperation on Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR): 4.5.1 Enhancing information exchange on IPR legislation and enforcement 
through meetings or seminars.  4.5.2 Jointly developing capacity building programmes in the 
IPR area.  4.5.3 Promoting cooperation among IPR offices.  
Id. art. 4. 
 40.  BRICS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICES COOPERATION ROADMAP 3 (2013) [hereinafter 
ROADMAP], http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/SIGNED-BRICS-IP-
OFFICES-COOPERATION-ROADMAP.pdf. 
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3. Promotion of public awareness on IP in BRICS countries 
4. National IP Strategy and IP Strategy for enterprises 
5. Information services on IP, e.g. exchange of patent 
documentation, taking account of local legislation 
6. Collaboration in International Forums as required and subject to 
consensus 
7. Examiner exchange programme41 
Specific domestic intellectual property offices in BRIC countries have been 
assigned tasks that reflect the intellectual property profile of each one of the 
BRICS in the so-called post-TRIPS era.42  For instance, South Africa, which until 
recently had not seriously considered implementing patent examination 
procedures, is by and large excluded from leadership roles in the patent field.  
Instead, the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission of South Africa it is 
in charge of creating “national IP strategies” and “IP strategies for enterprises.”43 
Training of intellectual property staff will be led by INPI,44 the Brazilian 
National Institute of Industrial Property (“The Institute”).45  The Institute was also 
tasked with supervising “IP/patent processes and procedures,” an area that is 
somewhat cryptically described as consisting of “search, classification [and] 
translation services, among others.”46 
China, through its State Intellectual Property Office, will be responsible for 
“[p]romotion of [p]ublic [a]wareness on Intellectual Property in BRICS 
countries”47 and for the broad category of “[i]nformation [s]ervices on IP.”48  This 
cooperation stream is described as targeting the enhancement of “information 
exchange on [intellectual property rights] legislation and enforcement through 
meetings or seminars.”49 
Rospatent, the Russian patent office, will be in charge of the examiner 
exchange program, which has the goal of promoting the “exchange of experiences” 
and, possibly, the exchange of examiners between patent offices of the BRICS.50 
Finally, India51 will lead “collaboration in [i]nternational [f]orums as required 
and subject to consensus.”52  This stream puts India in a position of acting as 
liaison between the BRICS and external interest groups, institutions, and fora.  It is 
 
 41.  Id. at 5. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  William New, supra note 6. 
 44.  ROADMAP, supra note 40, at 6. 
 45. See id. 
 46.  Id. at 8. 
 47.  Id. at 6. 
 48.  Id. at 8. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 7. 
 51.  The Roadmaps do not specify whether a particular branch of the Indian Office of the 
Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks (CGPDTM) will be in charge of acting as a 
liaison between the BRICS and other groups.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 10. 
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especially interesting to notice that the Roadmap establishes that the outcome of 
this stream should be an “[i]mproved influence of BRICS Offices within WIPO 
and other [f]orums.”53  The creation of this stream suggests that a deeper South-
South alignment of intellectual property policies will likely entail an emphasis on 
increasing bargaining power in fora where Northern interests have historically 
prevailed. 
As the coming years will show how strong the BRICS’s desired South-South  
alignment might become, it is already clear that the BRICS are specifically 
interested in incentivizing patent policy convergence and maximizing pro-
development strategies allowed under international patent law.  The Roadmap and 
the initial tasks assigned to national intellectual property offices undoubtedly set 
the framework for enhanced inter-BRICS cooperation, which might possibly pave 
the way towards a new understanding of South-South cooperation in intellectual 
property matters.  However, there is a myriad of issues beyond the sphere of 
patents on which South-South dialogue has been nearly inexistent.  Part III 
explores some of these issues, with a focus on international copyright law.  It 
argues that there is neglected space under international intellectual property law for 
developing countries to further their innovation agendas, particularly under TRIPS.  
Finally, it suggests that adoption of these measures is unlikely to trigger the kind of 
criticism and pressure from the North that patent-related reforms tend to attract. 
III. (RE)DEPARTING FROM TRIPS: GOING BEYOND TRADITIONAL FLEXIBILITIES 
A.  Drawing More “flexibility” from the TRIPS Agreement 
In an age in which we talk about post-WTO54 and post-TRIPS55 eras, there is 
a risk that one might lose sight of the fact that the architecture of our global IP 
regime and its ensuing dynamics are anchored in the TRIPS Agreement and will 
likely be so for decades to come.  More accurately, they are anchored in a certain 
interpretation of TRIPS that privileges the interests and bargaining power of the 
North.56  Nonetheless, TRIPS remains the legal framework within which 
developing countries have to operate.  At the same time, it has been abundantly 
emphasized that TRIPS is a minimum standards agreement,57 and that there is 
 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Salama, Towards an Intellectual Property Bargaining Theory: 
The Post-WTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 265 (2010); Peter Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): 
Protecting Intellectual Property in Power WTO China, 55 (4) AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) (regarding to 
the usage of the expression in connection with BRIC countries).  The term has spilled into fields outside 
law.  See e.g., Ranjanendra Narayan Nag & Bhaskar Goswami, Dual Economy Interlinkage in a 
Monetary Framework: A Post WTO Perspective, 20 J. ECON. INTEGRATION 497, 497-510 (2005). 
 55.  The expression has attained global usage over the last decade.  See, BURCU KILIÇ, BOOSTING 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION IN THE POST-TRIPS ERA: REAL-LIFE LESSONS FOR THE DEVELOPING 
WORLD (2014); Kenneth Shadlen, Reforming and Reinforcing the Revolution: The Post-TRIPS Politics 
of Patents in Latin America 1-21 (Global Dev. and Env’t Inst., Working Paper No. 09-02, 2009). 
 56.  See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE 
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1-5 (2008). 
 57.  See J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under 
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ample space in the treaty of which countries in the Global South are not making 
use in advancing their innovation agendas.58 
Some of this space is created by TRIPS flexibilities.59  Compulsory licensing 
is the most prominent example of countries in the South taking advantage of these 
flexibilities and, as seen in the previous section, some of the BRICS are paving the 
way for other developing countries wishing to incentivize the growth of domestic 
generic industries. 
Yet, countries in the South can find room in TRIPS outside the realm of 
traditional flexibilities to further normative frameworks more suited to their 
interests and developmental stages.  While TRIPS is not the only source of 
pressure for developing countries to adopt TRIPS-plus standards,60 there is an 
array of measures—particularly in the field of copyright—that 1) are TRIPS-
compatible, 2) do not increase the overall levels of intellectual property protection, 
and 3) are less likely to attract the level of scrutiny that patent-related flexibilities 
have historically triggered.61 
The following section surveys these options.  The list does not configure a set 
of measures that developing countries should adopt en bloc; rather, it illustrates 
individual proposals that would bring elements of flexibility into national 
intellectual property (namely copyright) regimes. 
B.  Proposals 
This section analyzes the following proposals: 1) the adoption of fair use 
 
the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW. 345 (1995).  See also Denis Borges 
Barbosa, Minimum Standards vs. Harmonization in the TRIPS Context: The Nature of Obligations 
under TRIPS and Modes of Implementation at the National Level in Monist and Dualist Systems, in 1 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 52-109 
(Carolos M. Correa ed., 2010)  
 58.  See Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the 
Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 (4) HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (2009). 
 59.  See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation between TRIPS and 
Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 420 (2011) (discussing the tension between TRIPS flexibilities and the widespread de 
facto application of TRIPS-plus standards).  See Duncan. Matthews, TRIPS Flexibilities and Access to 
Medicines in Developing Countries: the Problem with Technical Assistance and Free Trade 
Agreements, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 420, 420-427 (2005) (providing an overview of flexibilities in 
the specific context of access to medicines in the Global South); see also Sisule Musungu at al., 
Utilizing Trips Flexibilities For Public Health Protection Through South-South Regional Frameworks, 
S. CENTRE (Apr. 2004), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/collect/medicinedocs/pdf/s4968e/s4968e.pdf.   
 60.  See DEERE, supra note 56 (surveying the economic and ideational pressures developing 
countries face in building their domestic intellectual property frameworks).  For an account of the web 
of bilateral and multilateral agreements that push forward TRIPS-plus agendas, see Susan K. Sell, 
TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 
(2011) (noting that TRIPS is not the only source of pressure on intellectual property regimes for 
countries in the South, as well as in the North); see also Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? 
Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Agreements, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125 
(2004). 
 61.  See USTR, supra note 23. 
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standards; 2) the adoption of flexible licensing mechanisms; 3) the reconsideration 
of formalities in copyright law; 4) the creation of take-and-pay regimes; 5) the 
creation of a “local working requirement”-like provision in domestic copyright 
laws; 6) the removal of paying public domains; and 7) the reconsideration of moral 
rights. 
1. Adoption of Fair Use Standards 
The doctrine of fair use remains largely associated with American case law.62  
In The Fair Use/Fair Dealing Handbook, however, Band and Gerafi note that are 
over forty countries in the world with copyright laws that establish fair use or fair 
dealing63 provisions.64 Band and Gerafi also note that fair use/dealing regimes 
cover more than one-third of the world’s population, including a significant 
number of developing countries.65  The split is heavily skewered towards fair 
dealing, as the map below illustrates: 
 
 
 62.  For a cogent analysis of the mechanisms under which fair use operates, see William W. Fisher 
III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1744-1783 (1988). 
 63.  JONATHAN BAND & JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK 1 (2013), 
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/band-and-gerafi-2013.pdf.  More limited in scope 
than fair use, fair dealing originates in Chapter III of the U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 
1988 (Acts Permitted in relation to Copyright Works) and provides exceptions to copyright law in the 
cases of research and private study (Article 29) and criticism, review and news reporting (Article 30).  
See W. R. CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, 
TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS (2003). 
 64.  BAND & GERAFI supra note 63, at 1. 
 65.  Id. 
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Figure 1: Fair Use and Fair Dealing Around the World66 
Fair use models are often presented as “balancing mechanisms” against 
thickets of proprietary rights.67  Since the Copyright Act of 1976 codified fair use 
in the United States,68 courts and commentators have identified several ways in 
which fair use can make copyright regimes more balanced: fair use provisions can 
function as “safety valves” for fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech;69 
they can be used to cure market failures;70 they promote efficiency in cases where 
the value of access to and use of a copyrighted work is higher than the transaction 
 
 66.  Photo: Map created by Amy Bulgrien (citing BAND & GERAFI, supra note 63), 
http://www.librarycopyrightalliance.org/bm~doc/worldmap.pdf. 
 67.  See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007). 
 68.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2014). 
 69.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 540-41 (1985). 
 70.  See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). 
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costs associated with negotiating a license;71 and they are a “flexible and adaptable 
mechanism” that can adapt to the rise of new technologies.72 
One of the main criticisms often raised by fair use opponents is that it 
generates uncertainty and unpredictability.73  From a doctrinal point of view, fair 
use is routinely pitched against the European model of closed lists of exceptions 
and limitations.74  If approached through comparative lenses, fair use models will 
always offer less legal certainty.75  However, that uncertainty is modulated by the 
advantages of having regimes that, as a whole, offer more flexibility.76  
Additionally, it has also been pointed out that fair use is not intrinsically 
unpredictable.77  Rather, certain applications of fair use within a system might be 
conflicting,78 but fair use as a normative postulate offers a cogent and stable 
framework to deal with limitations on exclusive rights.79 
 
 71.  Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright Management Systems, 
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 44 (2001). 
 72.  Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in 
Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49, 51 (1993). 
 73.  CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 159 (2012); Amira Dotan, Niva et. al., Fair Use 
Best Practices for Higher Education Institutions: The Israeli Experience, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 
447 (2010).  Other critiques of fair use include claims that it is “doctrinally incoherent.”  Matthew Sag, 
Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 47, 51 (2012).  Some scholars point out that there is some 
tension between the U.S. model of fair use and TRIPS obligations.  Ruth Okediji, Toward an 
International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 115 (2000). 
 74.  P. B. Hugenholtz & Martin Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of Flexibilities 2 
(University of Amsterdam, Working Paper No. 2012-39, 2011). 
 75.  THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 149 (Annette 
Kur & Vytautas Mizaras eds., 2011).  Also, as it has been pointed out, “There is no model that can 
completely remove unpredictability from a flexible system, though proper understanding of case law 
and community norms can help.”  JENNIFER URBAN, REPORT 1: UPDATING FAIR USE FOR INNOVATORS 
AND CREATORS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: TWO TARGETED REFORMS 3 (2010), 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/fair-use-report-02132010.pdf.  
 76.  See Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 74. 
 77.  Sag, supra note 73, at 51; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and 
Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-
Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004). 
 78.  See URBAN, supra note 75; Sag, supra note 73 
 79.  See URBAN, supra note 75; Sag, supra note 73; Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 74. 
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Of the advantages usually associated with fair use, malleability in 
adapting to emerging technologies80 speaks directly to the needs of countries with 
specific interests in promoting industries that rely on digital chains of production 
and distribution.81 
There have already been several instances in the South in which fair use 
has been adopted82 or contemplated as a possibility in reforming copyright laws.83  
For instance, Nigeria has adopted an ad hoc fair dealing provision for folklore.84  
Uganda, which enacted its most recent copyright laws in 2003, codified a general 
fair use provision in Section 15 of the Intellectual Property Act.85  The Philippines 
enacted its most recent copyright law in 1997, and the following year the 
Intellectual Property Code came into force.86  Chapter VII, entitled “Limitations on 
Copyright,” codifies fair use.87 
A particularly interesting case is that of Israel, which, following a lengthy 
application of the British Copyright Act of 1911, enacted its first homebred 
copyright law in 2007.88  The law codified fair use in Section 19, closely modeled 
 
 80.  Carlos M. Correa, Fair Use and Access to Information in the Digital Era, in INFOETHICS 
2000: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIETAL CHALLENGES OF CYBERSPACE: THIRD INTERNATIONAL 
CONGRESS, NOV. 13-15, at 187, 187. 
 81.  This would be the case of countries with relevant music or film industries (e.g. Nollywood, 
the film industry in Nigeria).  It would also be the case of countries with specific interests within an 
industry or sector; once again, Nigeria offers an example in its protection of folklore through ad hoc fair 
use.  See Adebambo Adewopo, Protection and Administration of Folklore in Nigeria, in 3 SCRIPTED 1, 
7-8 (March 2006). 
 82.  Id. at 8. 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at 9. 
 85.  Intellectual Property Act 36 of 2003, §15 (Uganda), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3922. 
 86.  Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines §185 Ch. VII, Rep. Act 8293, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=129343. 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  See Copyright Act, 5768-2007,2007 LSI 34, 19 (2007)(Isr.), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=132095.  
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after the American fair use clause.89  Fair use was implemented in Israel 
specifically as a way to foster creativity.90  In 2005, the Preamble of the draft bill 
that would amend the existing copyright legislation read: 
The objective of the laws of Copyright is to establish an arrangement 
that will protect creative works while striking a balance between various 
interests of the public good.  The balance required is mainly between the 
need to provide a sufficient incentive to create, which is in the form of 
granting general financial rights in the creations, and between the need 
to enable the public to use the creations for the advancement of culture 
and knowledge.  This balance must be obtained while safeguarding the 
freedom of speech and freedom of creativity and while preserving free 
and fair competition.91 
 
Unlike the French-, Spanish-, and Portuguese-speaking countries in the Global 
South whose copyright laws are inscribed within a legal colonial heritage that 
crystalized closed lists of limitations and exceptions,92 in 2007, Israel transitioned 
from British copyright law93 (which recognized fair dealing as early as in the 
nineteenth century)94 to a fair use-based national law.  The gap was therefore 
narrower than the one in developing countries where Roman-Germanic traditions 
still prevail.  However, the move towards fair use had already been foreshadowed 
in cases decided by Israeli courts before the TRIPS Agreement was even 
 
 89.  See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Israeli Fair Use from an American Perspective, in CREATING 
RIGHTS: READINGS IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach eds.,2009). 
 90.  See Michael Birnhack, A Cultural Reading: Israel’s 2007 Copyright Act and the Creative 
Field, in AUTHORING RIGHTS: READINGS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 83 (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach 
eds., 2009); see also Meera Nair, Canada and Israel: Cultivating Fairness of Use 11 (Program on Info. 
Jus. & Intell. Prop. Working Paper No. 2012-14, 2012). 
 91.  Nair, supra note 90, at 30 (quoting Preamble of the Draft Bill Amending the Copyright Act 
(No. 196), 2005, HH. (Isr.)). 
 92.  See HENRI MAGER, LES DROITS COLONIAUX DE LA FRANCE (1890); DROIT ET ÉCONOMIE DE 
LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE (Vivant Michel ed.2014); Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodríguez-Cano et. al., 
COMENTARIOS A LA LEY DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL (2007); JMC TORRES, TRATADO ELEMENTAL 
DE DERECHO COLONIAL ESPAÑOL (1941); Leandro Fazollo Cezario, A Estrutura Jurídica no Brasil 
Colonial. Criação, ordenação e Implementação, in 1 REVISTA DO INSTITUTO DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO 
9, 5249 (2012).  
 93.  See Michael Birnhack, Mandatory Copyright: From Pre-Palestine to Israel, 1910-2007, in A 
SHIFTING EMPIRE: 100 YEARS OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT 1911, 16 (Uma Suthersanen & Ysolde 
Gendreau eds., 2012). 
 94.  See CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 63. 
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negotiated.95  Scholars and commentators often pinpoint a 1993 case decided by 
the Israeli Supreme Court as the first move towards a fair use-based regime.96  In 
Geva v. Walt Disney Company,97 the Israeli Supreme Court established that parody 
and satire were protected under the category of criticism in copyright law, and 
enunciated for the first time a four-factor test modeled after 17 U.S.C. § 107.98  
The 2007 law completed that move.99 
Before the 2007 Copyright Act was enacted, the drafter of the bill, Tamir 
Afori, answered several questions about the drafting process.  When asked about 
the reasons behind the preference for a fair use model in Israel, he framed fair use 
as a mechanism of balance in a world of ever-increasing proprietary rights: 
[The drafter of the bill] presented the development of fair use in Israel in 
context.  He emphasized that current Israeli law was insufficient to 
protect… cultural works.  That, despite the theoretical balance implied 
by copyright, copyright has steadily increased in one dimension only—
the expansion of rights to copyrights holders.  He presented his view 
that fair use was a key element in the pursuit for balance and made 
specific reference to Geva, whereby the closed list of allowable 
purposes denied the possibility of fair dealing [sic].100 
 
Incidentally, in its sweeping revision of 2007, Israel chose not to legislate on 
Digital Rights Management (“DRM”) technologies,101 a move that attracted 
prompt criticism from the United States Trade Representative and other 
institutional representatives in the Global North.102  This is a welcome exception in 
 
 95.  See Nair, supra note 90, at 17. 
 96.  See Netanel, supra note 89. 
 97.  CA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Company, 48(1) P.D. 251 (1993) (Isr.). 
 98.  Nair, supra note 90, at 15. 
 99.  Id. at 11.  
 100.  Id. at 34. 
 101.  Id. at 9-10. 
 102.  Israel was removed from the Special 301 Report in 2014, largely because of its patent reform 
in 2010.  Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Israel Removed from Special 301 
Report (Feb. 2014), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2014/February/Israel-removed-from-Special-301-Report. 
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an environment of mounting pressure to adopt Northern-inspired intellectual 
property legislation. 
As far as limitations to exclusive rights are concerned, Israel embodies the 
complete transition from fair dealing to fair use regimes.  More importantly, this 
particular transition offers evidence of intellectual property policies framed by the 
promotion of balance and creativity, an example that should inspire developing 
countries seeking to improve their copyright regimes. 
Inspiration can also be drawn from the North. South Korea has also 
adopted fair use.103  The most interesting feature of the Korean copyright law is not 
the fact that it contains fair use provisions, but the way it repeatedly resorts to the 
concept of fair use to inform its entire copyright law:104 
Article 1 (Purpose) 
The purpose of this Act is to protect the rights of authors and the 
neighboring rights and to promote fair use of works in order to 
contribute to the improvement and development of the culture and 
related industries (emphasis added).105 
 
It is remarkable that fair use is explicitly identified as a mechanism of balance 
(indeed, as the mechanism of balance) between monopolistic rights and socio-
cultural goals.  The Copyright Act also does a good job in linking fair use, as well 
as the overall idea of balance in the copyright system, to the concepts of 
“improvement” and “development.”106  It is especially interesting that “culture and 
related industries” also figure in the opening lines of the Act (and in immediate 
 
 103.  See Jaewoo Cho, As Korea Implements Fair Use, Two Cases Offer Precedent for Flexible 
Copyright Exceptions and Limitations, INFOJUSTICE.ORG, (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://infojustice.org/archives/28561.  
 104.  South Korea Copyright Act, Act No. 432, Jan. 28, 1957, amended by Act No. 9625, April 22, 
2009 (S. Kor.), http://www.moj.go.kr. 
 105.  Id. art. 1. 
 106.  Id. 
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connection with fair use).107  Much of the current discourse on “cultural,” 
“creative,” or “copyright” industries is tied to expansive approaches to 
copyright.108  When applied to industries in developing countries, this discourse 
(Northern, in nature) is usually vehement in advocating for strong copyright 
regimes.  Suggestions that fair use might be key to the “development” or 
“improvement” of these industries are rare, and therefore it would be particularly 
relevant for policymakers in the developing world to take the Korean law into 
consideration when assessing their copyright environments. 
Overall, there is an argument to be made that fair use models can 
introduce an element of flexibility into domestic copyright laws.  For developing 
countries that adhere to this proposition, legal and historical heritages might 
prevent them from considering the adoption of fair use models.  However, recent 
incorporation of generic fair use clauses (as well as ad hoc fair use) into copyright 
laws in the South suggests a possible opening towards the expansion of these 
models.  Even outside South-South exchanges, the examples set by Israel and 
South Korea should not go unnoticed in the developing world. 
Among the largest economies in the South, the copyright laws of India 
and South Africa contain fair dealing provisions, as a result of their former 
 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2010, Creative Economy 
Report 2010, xxiv, 171-79, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2010/3, 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=946.  The same entity has published 
reports on “Strengthening the Creative Industries for Development” with a specific focus on 
Mozambique and Zambia.  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Strengthening the 
Creative Industries for Development in Mozambique, 2011, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2009/2, 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditctab20092_en.pdf; Strengthening the Creative Industries for Development 
in Zambia, 2011, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2009/1, 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditctab20091_en.pdf. 
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association with the legal regime of the United Kingdom.109  As emerging 
economies in the South share experiences as part of a strategy to improve their 
intellectual property regimes, fair use and fair dealing could become potential 
topics for these exchanges. 
2. Adoption of Flexible Licensing Mechanisms for Copyrighted Works 
Amending or reenacting intellectual property laws—a process that would 
be required for the incorporation of clauses like fair use, for instance—is a lengthy 
process that is subject to several political and practical constraints.110  Making 
copyright systems more balanced as a whole (or even contributing partially 
towards that goal by incorporation of fair use regimes) is therefore a long-term 
proposition.111 
Inside copyright law, there are alternatives to counter the rigidity of 
current maximalist regimes.  One of those alternatives is flexible licensing, which 
was pioneered on a large scale in 2002 with the launch of Creative Commons.112 
Creative Commons (“CC”) licenses were created to respond directly to 
the “explosion of copyright events caused by the proliferation of digital 
technologies.”113  Relying on proprietary rights, these licenses enable copyright 
holders to quickly and efficiently demarcate the scope of their monopolies, which 
in turn facilitates permitted uses of their protected work:114 
 
 109.  See infra, p. 24. 
 110.  See DEERE, supra note 56, at 4; Barbosa, supra note 57. 
 111.  And one that, if recent history repeats itself, will likely entails\ multiple failures. 
 112.  History, CREATIVECOMMONS.ORG, creativecommons.org/about/history (last visited Feb. 12, 
2015). 
 113.  See Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons as Conversational Copyright, in 1 INTELL. PROP. 
& INFO. WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 445, 446 (Peter K. Yu, ed., 2007). 
 114.  This aspect has led some scholars to refer to flexible licensing mechanisms as “conversation 
copyright.”  See id. at 452 (“Creative Commons copyright licenses embody a vision of conversational 
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A Creative Commons license is a form [of] copyright license that can be 
linked to via the World Wide Web.  The principle of a Creative 
Commons license is to replace the default “all rights reserved” approach 
with a more modest “some rights reserved” approach that permits a 
variety of uses subject to one or more limitations that the copyright 
owner has placed on the work.  In addition to the legal code, the license 
is described by a “human-readable” Commons Deed, which identifies 
the key terms of the license and machine-readable metadata that 
associate the Internet location of the licensed resource with the Internet 
location of the license document.  From the user’s perspective, the 
presence of a Creative Commons license answers the question, “what 
can I do with this” by assuring that, subject to the license conditions, the 
user can: (i) copy the work; (ii) distribute the work; (iii) display or 
perform the work; and (iv) make a digital public performance of the 
work (i.e., Web casting).115 
 
Originally seen as “a work in progress, an ongoing natural experiment”116 (and not 
without its detractors),117 CC licenses quickly spread online.118  “Today, there are 
over 882 million pieces of CC-licensed (or CC0) content on the web,”119  of which 
approximately 56% is licensed under terms that allow “both adaptations and 
commercial use.”120  The 2014 Report on the State of the Commons estimates that 
in 2015, over 1 billion CC-licensed works will be reached.121 
 
copyright. Within this vision, creators or copyright owners seek to facilitate use of their expression for 
purposes such as dialog and education.”). 
 115.  Id. at 448. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  See e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Creative Commons: A Skeptical View of a Worthy Pursuit, in THE 
FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 1, 2 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Lucie Guibault, eds., 2006) (forthcoming 
2006). 
 118.  Michael Carroll offers the following explanation for the popularity of CC licenses in the mid-
2000s.  Carroll, supra note 113, at 455 (“What explains the rapid proliferation of Creative Commons 
licenses on the Internet?  Among those who choose the licenses, the explanations almost certainly are 
varied, for indeed one size does not fit all.  From the user’s perspective, however, the growth of the 
licensed commons points up a new dimension for measuring relevance—the use value of information 
found on digital networks….  For those seeking to use information drawn from the Web, works 
available under a Creative Commons license have greater use relevance because the legal terms of use 
over and above fair use are clearly specified.”). 
 119.  State of the Commons, CREATIVE COMMONS (Nov. 2014), 
https://stateof.creativecommons.org/report/. 
 120.  Id.  This type of Creative Commons license is known as “free culture license.”  The most 
commons type of license is BY-SA (attribution-share alike): 
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While the bulk of CC licensing occurs in North America and Europe 
(37% and 34%, respectively), there are signs of salutary activity in the Global 
South, with Latin America capturing 10% of the share (against 16% in the Asia-
Pacific area, which includes large economies like China, India and Australia).122  
In sub-Saharan Africa, the number falls to a modest 1% (the “Arab world” takes 
the remaining 2%).123 
With digital technologies expanding quickly even among some of the 
poorest regions, an argument can be made that CC licenses can be especially 
beneficial in struggling economies of the South.  In these countries, transaction 
costs associated with these licenses are lower than the cost of obtaining a 
traditional license,124 and they increase legal certainty.125 
 
 
Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. While in the North CC licenses can be considered “free,” in many Southern economies access to 
tablets or computers remains a hurdle. 
 125. They do so in two ways: first, they are likely to increase certainty regarding ownership of digital 
works; and second, as rights holders tailor their CC licenses to their specific needs, second-comers have 
clearer indications regarding permitted uses of a given work. 
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The following map (Fig. 2) shows the distribution of ongoing CC 
licensing (as of 2014), with the darker colors denoting increased CC licensing 
activity: 
 
Figure 2: Creative Commons—Data by Country126 
The only country in the Global South that matches (and in some cases 
surpasses) the levels of CC licensing in the North is Brazil.  This fact lends some 
weight to the idea that CC licenses can positively impact copyright “dialogue” in 
emerging and developing economies, although it comes with a cautionary note.  
The Brazilian experience with Creative Commons is highly idiosyncratic.127  
Former minister of culture Gilberto Gil played a pivotal role in propelling CC 
licenses.  Gil, one of the most popular and critically acclaimed singer-songwriters 
 
 126. Photo: State of the Commons, supra note 119. 
 127. See, e.g., Davide Maria Parrilli, Creative Commons Licenses in Brazil: Legal, Economic and 
Social Implications, 8 (2) ICFAI U. J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 38 (May 27, 2009). 
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in the history of Brazilian music,128 was appointed minister of culture by populist 
president “Lula” da Silva in 2003.129  Until he quit in 2008, Gil pursued a policy of 
cultural diversity and technological development.130 
After Gil left, the Ministry of Culture removed the Creative Commons 
logo from its official website.131  As the head of Creative Commons Brazil put it at 
the time: 
After this change the website of the Ministry of Culture has no license 
that authorizes the use of the content that is there.  The CC license has 
been replaced by a phrase that from a legal standpoint does not mean 
anything (“The contents of this site, produced by the Ministry of 
Culture, can be reproduced provided that the source is cited”).  Anyone 
using the contents of the site faces a huge problem of legal uncertainty: 
this usage does not have support in any legal document.  Moreover, the 
phrase that the Ministry put on the site to replace CC license refers only 
to ‘reproduction’.  CC licenses have a much broader and better 
formulation, including collaborative production, the development of 
derivative works, dissemination and so on.132 
 
Ironically, on the same day the Ministry of Culture erased the Creative Commons 
logo from its website, the Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento, e Gestão 
(roughly, Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management) released its policy to 
 
 128. See Gustavo Krieger & Olimpio Cruz Neto, O Mito e o Ministro [The Myth and the Minister], 
ROLLING STONE BRASIL (Nov. 2, 2006), http://rollingstone.uol.com.br/edicao/2/o-mito-e-o-
ministro#imagem0; Gilberto Gil, PRODUÇĂO CULTURAL, 
http://www.producaocultural.org.br/slider/gilberto-gil/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (Br.); Larry Rohter, 
Gilberto Gil and the Politics of Music, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/12/arts/12iht-gil.4882061.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 129. See Latin America: The Return of Populism, ECONOMIST (Apr. 12, 2006), 
http://www.economist.com/node/6802448.  
 130. Ariel F. Nunes, Pontos de cultura e os novos paradigmas das Políticas Públicas Culturais: 
reflexões Macro e Micro-Políticas 1, in FUNDAÇÃO CASA DE RUI BARBOSA, 
http://www.casaruibarbosa.gov.br/dados/DOC/palestras/Politicas_Culturais/II_Seminario_Internacional
/FCRB_ArielNunes_Pontos_de_cultura_e_os_novos_paradigmas_das_politicas_publicas_culturais.pdf. 
 131. See Ronaldo Lemos, A Legacy at Risk: How the New Ministry of Culture in Brazil Reversed its 
Digital Agenda, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Mar. 14, 2011), https://freedom-to-
tinker.com/blog/rlemos/legacy-risk-how-new-ministry-culture-brazil-reversed-its-digital-agenda/; 
Marília Maciel, Brazilian Ministry of Culture Removes Creative Commons Licenses from its Website, 
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Jan. 23, 2011), http://infojustice.org/archives/867; Mônica Herculano, Site do MinC 
Retira selo Creative Commons e Causa Polêmica [Ministry of Culture Site Removes Creative Commons 
Seal and Causes Controversy], CULTURA & MERCADO (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://www.culturaemercado.com.br/politica/site-do-minc-retira-selo-creative-commons-e-causa-
polemica/. 
 132. Marília Maciel, supra note 131. 
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promote Brazilian public software133 on the Official Journal, calling for “free 
software and flexible licensing.”134 
Even though institutional support for Creative Commons in general has 
decreased since Gil left the Ministry of Culture, CC licensing remains higher in 
Brazil than anywhere else in the South.135  If nothing else, the Brazilian experience 
illustrates the viability of flexible licensing in developing economies where access 
to digital technologies is fast becoming more widespread. 
While TRIPS requires member states to protect certain categories of 
works under domestic copyright laws,136 it does not prevent copyright owners from 
giving away (or not exercising) some of their rights.  Therefore, flexible and 
expedited licensing does not contravene copyright law; rather, it is a mechanism 
designed to increase the efficiency of copyright markets that is anchored in 
copyright law itself.  Creative Commons (or similar licensing frameworks) can 
thus become valuable mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and increase legal 
certainty in developing countries currently experiencing accelerated technological 
leapfrogging. 
 
 133. See PORTAL DO SOFTWARE PUBLICO BRASILEIRO, http://www.softwarepublico.gov.br (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2015).  The expression “software público brasileiro” refers to open source software that is both 
used and sponsored by the federal government.  See Edgy Paiva, Use of Open Source Software by the 
Brazilian Government, TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. R. (May 2009), http://timreview.ca/article/250 
(describing, in English, the history of government-sponsored use of open source software in Brazil).   
 134. Herculano, supra note 131. 
 135. See Parrilli, supra note 127; State of the Commons, supra note 119. 
 136. TRIPS Agreement supra note 9, art. 9(1) (incorporating articles 1 through 21 of the Berne 
Convention). 
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3. Reconsidering Formalities in Copyright Law 
Modern copyright law is mostly devoid of formalities.137  While up to the 
late nineteenth century formalities were generally a prerequisite for the existence 
or exercise of copyrights, the 1908 revision of the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works established that international copyright 
arises automatically and is enforced independently of formalities: 
(2) The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to 
any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of 
the existence of protection in the country of origin of the work. 
Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent 
of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to 
protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the 
country where protection is claimed. (emphasis added)138 
 
Formalities are “conditions precedent to the existence or enforcement of 
copyright,”139 which include requirements regarding registration, deposit, notice, 
recordation of transfers and assignments, and renewal of copyrights.140  These 
conditions may be constitutive of copyrights (such as in the cases of notice or 
renewal), or simply affect enforcement of existing copyrights (such as registration 
or deposit).141 
These prerequisites were in vogue until the early twentieth century142 
because they can help (i) promote legal certainty when copyright disputes arise,143 
 
 137. See STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR HISTORY, 
RATIONALES AND POSSIBLE FUTURE (2011). 
 138. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5, ¶ 2, Jul. 24, 1971, 1161 
U.N.T.S. 18338 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (art. 4 ¶ 2 of the 1908 Berne Convention). 
 139. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The US Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate 
Relationship, 33 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 311, 312 (2010). 
 140. VAN GOMPEL, supra note 137, at 17. 
 141. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 312. 
 142. VAN GOMPEL, supra note 137, at 1 (Although some countries began removing them in the late 
nineteenth century). 
 143. Id. at 43. 
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(ii) expedite rights clearance mechanisms,144 and (iii) “enhance the free flow of 
information by enlarging the public domain.”145  While the 1908 revision of the 
Berne Convention prohibited the imposition of formalities on foreign works, 
throughout the twentieth century, most countries chose to remove formalities 
affecting domestic works.146 
In recent years, however, the development of digital and online markets 
has triggered a wave of calls for a global reinstatement of copyright formalities.147  
These calls appear to revolve around the first two functions that formalities have 
classically been associated with—maintenance of legal certainty (now in the online 
environment) and reduction of transaction costs in licensing processes.148  Some 
authors go as far as suggesting that reinstating formalities would “facilitate 
licensing and to cure the problem of orphan works” in the digital environment.149 
Even under current international law,150 some types of formalities may 
exist.151  As it has been pointed out, “not every record-keeping or even litigation-
 
 144. Id. at 287. 
 145. Id. at 7-12, 287.  
 146. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 313. 
 147. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 139; Cecil C. Kuhne, III, The Steadily Shrinking Public Domain: 
Inefficiencies of Existing Copyright Law in the Modern Technology Age, 50 LOY. L. REV. 549, 562 
(2004); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
471, 477, 518 (2003); Genevieve P. Rosloff, “Some Rights Reserved”: Finding the Space Between All 
Rights Reserved and the Public Domain, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 37, 37 (2009); Christopher Sprigman, 
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004). 
 148. See Stef Van Gompel, Copyright Formalities in the Internet Age: Filters of Protection or 
Facilitators of Licensing, 28 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1425, 1427 (2013); see also Sprigman, supra note 147, 
at 487. 
 149. Copyright Formalities in the Internet Age: Filters of Protection or Facilitators of Licensing, supra 
note 148, at 1426. 
 150. The Berne Convention, supra note 137, art. 5 ¶ 2 (as incorporated by the TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 9, at art. 9 ¶ 1).  
 151. See VAN GOMPEL, supra note 137.  Also, Ginsburg points out, Berne does not preclude the 
imposition of formalities as a prerequisite for certain acts of enforcement.  Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 
315 (“In the sense of the Berne Convention, the formalities that art. 5(2) prohibits member States from 
imposing on foreign authors include ‘everything which must be complied with in order to ensure that 
the rights of the author with regard to his work may come into existence.’  Thus requirements such as 
registration, the deposit or filing of copies, the payment of fees, or the making of declarations or 
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related obligation a State imposes should be considered a Berne-banned 
‘formality.’”152  Berne stands in the way of a full “reformalization” of copyright 
law in general,153 but the core of prohibited formalities is composed of formalities 
that are imposed on foreign authors and that include “everything which must be 
complied with in order to ensure that the rights of the author with regard to his 
work may come into existence.”154 
(Re)introducing formalities like deposit or notice as prerequisites for the 
recognition of copyrights of foreign authors would therefore be forbidden under 
Berne,155 but certain “requirements of form,” for instance, are generally deemed 
acceptable under the current international intellectual property regime.156 An 
example of such a requirement would be mandatory recordation of copyright 
transfers in a centralized database, which would help “determine the way in which 
a transfer of copyright must be effectuated or which corroborate the existence or 
scope of the relevant transaction,”157 but neither affects the constitutive dimension 
of foreign copyright nor impairs enforcement of rights.158 
 
affixing notices to copies of the work, may not be made mandatory preconditions to protection.  But 
State-imposed preconditions on the coming-into-being of the author’s rights represent only part of the 
Berne-targeted formalities.  An author may be vested with copyright, but unable to enforce her rights 
unless she complies with a variety of prerequisites to suit.”).  
 152. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 316. 
 153. See Sprigman, supra note 147, at 562 (In particular, imposition of formalities at the level of 
remedies is likely to trigger some concerns under Berne and TRIPS); see Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 
317-18 (noting “conditioning certain remedies on registration of the work may be problematic.  
Arguably, so long as a Berne Member State leaves basic claims for injunctive relief and statutory 
damages unencumbered by formalities, it may limit the availability of enhanced remedies, such as 
statutory damages, to compliance with registration or other obligations.  However, ‘the difference 
between a permissible conditioning of an enhanced remedy, and an impermissible conditioning of an 
effective remedy may not always be apparent, thus making the distinction a delicate one in practice.’”). 
 154. SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: 
THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the Berne Convention). 
 155. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 316-17. 
 156. VAN GOMPEL, supra note 137, at 204. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 154, at 316-317. 
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Another feature of the Berne Convention that is relevant for countries 
considering the adoption of copyright formalities is the fact that the principle of 
non-discrimination only applies to foreign works and authors.159  Differential 
treatment of copyrighted works is therefore allowed, as long as the protection 
afforded to foreign works is compatible with the principle of national treatment 
encapsulated in Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement.160  In other words, foreign 
works have to be treated at least as favorably as domestic works, but nothing 
prevents a country from treating domestic works less favorably than foreign works. 
In light of this framework, developing countries with specific interests in 
promoting legal certainty and reducing transaction costs associated with copyright 
licensing can incorporate Berne-compliant formalities into their legislations, and 
they may do so targeting exclusively domestic works.  For instance, after 
amending its law to comply with the Berne Convention, the United States decided 
to impose registration of domestic (but not foreign) works as a prerequisite for 
infringement actions.161 
Countries where legal certainty regarding ownership of rights is 
problematic may consider registration formalities targeting domestic works.  
Already in the South, there are examples of this trend.  Nigeria, for instance, has a 
notification scheme partially inspired by the United States’ regime: 
It is not a mandatory registration scheme but rather a platform to enable 
authors [to] give notice of the existence of their work in which copyright 
 
 159. See, UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 74-75 (2005). 
 160. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3 (“Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this 
Agreement to the nationals of other Members. . . “). 
 161. However, U.S. law makes registration a prerequisite for both foreign and domestic works for 
obtaining statutory damages recovering attorney’s fees; in the absence of registration (up to three 
months after publication of the work), copyright holders can only be awarded damages and profits in 
cases of infringement of their work. 
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subsists.  Unlike the recordation system in the United States, failure by a 
copyright owner to notify the Nigerian Copyright Commission through 
the notification scheme on the existence of a work does not affect the 
right of a copyright owner to commence an action in respect of an 
infringement suit requiring enforcement.162 
 
Countries concerned with increasing litigiousness or judiciary backlog may want to 
adopt a system closer to the American model, while those focused on legal 
certainty might opt for a regime closer to the Nigerian one. 
4. Adoption of Take-and-pay Regimes to Promote Sectorial Interests 
Proposals to establish liability regimes for specific kinds of intellectual 
property rights are not new.163  Liability rules consist in the payment of an 
“objectively determined value” for some sort of entitlement,164 and in the case of 
intellectual property that entitlement is the monopoly of the author or the inventor.  
Proponents of liability (or “take-and-pay”) regimes in intellectual property 
contexts tend to emphasize arguments of economic efficiency over distributional 
goals or other motivations in classic theory on liability rules.165  This trend is 
especially salient in discourse regarding the digital environment, where case law 
and doctrine on peer-to-peer infringement is often conflicting or unclear.166 
While intellectual property liability regimes might lower transaction costs 
as they replace traditional licensing mechanisms, they have been criticized for 
 
 162. Kunle Ola, Evolution and Future Trends of Copyright in Nigeria, 2 (1) J. OPEN ACCESS L., no.1, 
2014 1, 6, http://ojs.law.cornell.edu/index.php/joal/article/view/26. 
 163. See Jerome H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 
COLUM. L.REV. 2432, 2504 (1995). 
 164. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
 165. See KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF 
DIGITAL SAMPLING (2011); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property 
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996), 
 166. And they are also at the core of proposal for reverse liability rules in digital copyright. MCLEOD & 
DICOLA, supra note 165. 
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“their lack of flexibility and for their susceptibility to political lobbying.”167  
However, even commentators who acknowledge the general drawbacks of these 
regimes concede: 
[T]here would be transaction cost benefits to a compulsory license for 
any copyrighted material integrated into a multimedia product.  Such a 
license would obviously eliminate many of the costs that currently 
plague the multimedia industry.168 
 
Proposals to create “default liability regimes” were originally construed with 
patentable innovation in mind,169 but a growing number of commentators have 
adapted liability to copyright law.170  Most of these proposals have users of 
copyrighted goods in developed countries in mind.171  However, take-and-pay 
regimes could be especially useful in the South, in countries with fast growing 
industries that rely on production and distribution of digital goods. 
Developing countries wishing to support the growth of copyright-
intensive industries, for example, can benefit from offering a “fixed pricing 
menu”172 for some uses of protected works, therefore avoiding the higher 
transaction costs associated with atomized negotiation of licensing agreements.  A 
concrete example of this proposal would be the adoption of take-and-pay regimes 
for music to be used in film.173  In developing countries where production and 
distribution of digital film occurs at an extraordinarily fast pace and where budgets 
 
 167. Merges, supra note 165, at 1376. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Reichman, supra note 163, at 2504. 
 170. See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 165, at 217-18 (arguing that traditional copyright regimes 
might not be enough to incentivize creation in musical genres that depend on digital sampling).  See 
also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural 
Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to 
Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003). 
 171. See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 165; Netanel, supra note 170. 
 172. Merges, supra note 165, at 1377. 
 173. Id. at 1380. 
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for production of original content are limited,174 a take-and-pay regime narrowly 
aimed at expediting exchanges with the music industry could benefit nascent and 
mid-sized film industries in the South. 
5. Creation of a “Local Working Requirement”-like Provision in 
Domestic Copyright Laws 
The concept of “local working requirement” is synonym with patent law 
and with the kind of innovation that the traditional TRIPS flexibilities were 
designed to protect.  However, this section argues that this specific feature of 
patent law could inspire a similar mechanism to be used selectively in domestic 
copyright laws of developing countries, particularly in connection with the cultural 
industries. 
Working requirements are rooted in article 27 of TRIPS175 and were 
created to ensure the exploitation of patented inventions: “Local working 
requirements require the patent holder to manufacture the patented product or 
apply the patented process (i.e., “work” the patent) within the country granting the 
patent rights in order to maintain its exclusive exploitive rights.”176 
In patent law, some interpretations of article 27(1) of TRIPS have raised 
concerns about the admissibility of local working provisions under international 
 
 174. An example of such an industry is Nollywood, the Nigerian film industry, which over the past few 
years has disputed the title of second largest film industry in the world with India’s Bollywood 
(Hollywood retains the first position).  See Uchenna Onuzulike, Nollywood: The Birth of Nollywood: 
The Nigerian Movie Industry, 22 (1) BLACK CAMERA 25 (2007); Olufunmilayo Arewa, The Rise of 
Nollywood: Creators, Entrepreneurs, and Pirates, (U.C. Irvine School of Law, Research Paper Series 
No. 2012-11) (discussing the intellectual property issues surrounding the Nigerian film industry); 
Andrew Rice, A Scorsese in Lagos: The Making of Nigeria’s Film Industry, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 23 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/magazine/nollywood-movies.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 175. TRIPS Agreement supra note 9, at art. 27 
 176. Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The 
Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working Requirements, 19 Minn. J. Int’l L. 275, 281 
(2010). 
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law.177  Article 27(1) of TRIPS forbids discrimination based on place of invention, 
field of technology and “whether products are imported or locally produced 
(emphasis added).”178  If this article is interpreted as a stand-alone provision, 
domestic legislations containing local working requirements can theoretically be 
construed as discriminating against patents on goods that are imported or not 
locally produced.179 
However, TRIPS Article 2(1)180 incorporates significant portions of the 
Paris Convention,181 including Article 5(A)(2), which was revised in the 
Stockholm Conference of 1967 to allow for compulsory licensing to be issued in 
cases of abuse of patent rights.182  The article goes on to list only one example of a 
behavior that would qualify as abusive under Paris (and hence TRIPS) standards 
and that example is precisely failure to work a patent.183 
Even if the local working requirement has fueled discussion in the patent 
field, international and harmonized domestic copyright law is not subject to the 
 
 177. See JUSTIN MALBON ET AL, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 48 (2014) (describing the potential tension 
between TRIPS Article 27’s non-discrimination provision and local working provisions in domestic 
legislations).  See also Mercurio & Tyagi, supra note 176, at 286-287. 
 178. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27.  
 179. See MALBON ET AL., supra note 177.  This kind of interpretation derives from absolutist views of 
Article 27, like the one favored by the WTO Panel in Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products, in which the Panel endorsed the view that “discrimination means any form of differential 
treatment.”  Maria Victoria Stout, Crossing the TRIPS Nondiscrimination Line: How CAFTA 
Pharmaceutical Patent Provisions Violate TRIPS Article 27.1, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 177, 180 
(2008).  See also Panel Report, Canada–Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.98, 
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000). 
 180. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 2 (“(1): In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement, 
Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967).  (2) 
Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may 
have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the 
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.”). 
 181. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 
U.N.T.S. 303. 
 182. Id. art. 5(A)(2) (“Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures 
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the 
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.”).  
 183. Id.; see GEORGE H. C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, AS REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967 (2007). 
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non-discrimination clause of TRIPS Article 27.  It would therefore be possible to 
establish normative frameworks for local (meaning national) “working 
requirements” for holders of assigned copyrights that are not exploiting their 
monopolies.184 Under this proposal, if a local rights holder—a publisher, a 
company, etc.—is not using the music or film whose rights it has acquired, then 
the author of the work may regain control of the right or bundle of rights that he or 
she has given away.185 
Such a proposal would be especially effective for emerging cultural 
industries in the developing world.  A “working requirement” would protect 
misinformed authors and authors with poor bargaining tools who assign their rights 
to entities that end up not using their work—and, hence, that do not foster the goals 
that copyright regimes are supposed to incentivize. 
A “working requirement” in domestic copyright law would therefore 
advance the principles that TRIPS expressly seeks to promote.  Article 7 of the 
Agreement, entitled “Objectives,” states that 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.186 
 
TRIPS frames intellectual property as a propeller of “social and economic 
welfare.”187  Protecting parties in traditionally weaker bargaining positions 
(authors) under the circumstances that would be subject to “copyright working 
 
 184. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 183, at 86. 
 185. See id. 
 186. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 7. 
 187. Id. 
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requirements” would be consistent with this goal of promotion of welfare.  This 
proposal would also generate positive externalities, as authors who recapture their 
rights after inactivity (or insufficient activity) of the assignee have arguably more 
incentives to seek alternative chains to monetize their work.  Additionally, the 
requirement of “local working” in itself can be construed as a balancing 
mechanism, in line with the spirit and letter of the last part of Article 7. 
In addition to Article 7, TRIPS also lists a set of principles that inform 
implementation of intellectual property regimes: 
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures 
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices 
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international 
transfer of technology.188 
A “local working requirement” in domestic copyright laws would also be 
consistent with these principles, not only in face of the increasing socio-economic 
relevance of the industries targeted by this proposal, but also because the behaviors 
that would trigger the penalty inherent to a working requirement—i.e., inactivity, 
insufficient activity of the rights holder—can potentially be construed as abuses of 
intellectual property rights. 
 
 188. Id. art. 8. 
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Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, often alluded to but generally underused,189 
would therefore provide normative support if challenges to “working requirement” 
in domestic copyright laws were to arise. 
Although a “copyright working requirement” could be construed narrowly 
to apply to one or more strategic industries, it could also be applicable 
transversally.  As I will argue with regard to moral rights,190 the best scenario 
would be for “working requirements” to be generally applicable to all kinds of 
copyrighted goods in a given country, but nothing would prevent a developing 
country with a specific thriving industry to regulate only one kind of goods (e.g., 
film, crafts, and books) produced nationally.  Several studies in the patent field 
have shown that working requirements have been helpful for emerging economies, 
particular in the case of pharmaceuticals.191  In spite of the differences between 
regulation of patents and that of copyrights, these studies show that measures 
geared towards a specific intellectual property-intensive industry can boost 
performance within the industry and lead to spillover effects.192  The same logics 
would apply with regard to the so-called “copyright industries” and therefore 
policymakers in a given country may find a “local working requirement” necessary 
(or socially/politically easier to implement) only in the case of one or two 
industries. 
 
 189. See Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPs Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979 
(2009). 
 190. See infra, pp. 41-45. 
 191. See, e.g., Kenneth Shadlen, The Politics of Patents and Drugs in Brazil and Mexico: The Industrial 
Bases of Health Policies, 42 (1) COMP. POL. 41 (2009); Shamnad Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS: 
The Patents (Amendment) Act 2005, 1 INDIAN J. L. & TECH. 15 (2005); Mueller, supra note 14. 
 192. Id. 
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A possible argument against this proposal is that analogies between 
patents and copyrights are bound to be imperfect, as the two fields, while operating 
under shared principles of classical intellectual property, obey different incentives 
schemes and employ different strategies to cure market failures.  However, this 
would not be the first time that copyright doctrine borrows inspiration from 
patents.193  Moreover, the overarching goal of bringing more stability194 and 
fairness into copyright regimes would constitute an additional motive for 
implementing “working requirements” in a field where such a notion would, at 
first, be a transplant. 
6. Removal of Paying Public Domains 
While particularly prominent among developing countries in Africa and 
Latin America, the idea of a paying public domain is actually Northern in origin 
and scope.  The concept of a “domaine public payant” was offered as early as 1858 
by Pierre-Jules Hetzel in La propr ié té  l i t téra ire  e t  le  domaine  publ ic  
payant , 195 an idea to which Victor Hugo quickly subscribed.196  Largely based on 
derivations of natural rights theories, the concept gained some recognition in the 
French literary and artistic milieu in the late nineteenth century.197  This coincided 
with the emergence arguments in favor of systemic protection of intellectual 
 
 193. Consider the concept of “substantial non-infringing use” that migrated from patent to the copyright 
lexicon in American intellectual property law.  See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 418 (1984).  Admittedly, this is the narrowest of examples, but it shows that similar 
exchanges are not unheard of. 
 194. “Stability” in the sense of restoring the rules of incentives that copyright supposedly gives authors 
to create and disseminate their work. 
 195. See P I E R R E - J U L E S  H E T Z E L ,  L A  P R O P R I É T É  L I T T É R A I R E  E T  L E  D O M A I N E  
P U B L I C  P A Y A N T  ( I m p r i m e r i e  d e  Ve u v e  J .  Va n  G u g g e n h o u d t  1 8 5 8 )  ( F r ) .  
 196. Id. 
 197. LUCIE M. C. R. GUIBAULT ET AL., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS 
IN INFORMATION LAW 90 (2006) 
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property rights in continental Europe, which tended to emphasize the personality of 
the creator as the main underlying justification for the grant of such rights.198 
Countries sharing France’s legal traditions and philosophies also 
considered adopting paying public domains during this period.199  Italy, for 
instance, introduced a pubblico dominio pagante in 1865,200 but abolished it in 
1996.201 
In Eastern Europe, several countries implemented different forms of 
paying public domains.  The most interesting example is that of Hungary, which in 
1978 introduced a paying public domain for works of art, but excluded audiovisual 
works and sound recordings from the regime.202  However, the money collected 
under this mechanism was distributed to all kinds of authors, including those of 
audiovisual and literary works.203  Other countries in the region, like the Czech 
Republic, adopted paying public domains during the Cold War period, but 
abandoned this regime during the 1990s.204 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See LAURA CHIMIENTI, LINEAMENTI DEL NUOVO DIRITTO D’AUTORE: AGGIORNATO CON IL 
D.LGS 118/2006 E CON IL D.LGS.140/2006, 347 (Giuffrè Editore 7th ed. 2006) (It.). 
 201. Id. at 347. 
 202. See CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY, SUMMARY OF THE HUNGARIAN COPYRIGHT LAW, 
http://www.library.ceu.hu/hucop.pdf. 
 203. See KAROL JAKUBOWITZ & PIERRE JEANRAY, CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: AUDIOVISUAL 
LANDSCAPE AND COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION 120 (Peter Barber Languages trans., 1st ed. 1994). 
 204. Id. 
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Several developing countries have also experimented with variations on 
the concept of the paying public domain, from the largest economies in the 
South205 to more modest ones.206 
The problem with paying public domains is that they impose the payment 
of a tax-like fee on goods that are no longer protected by copyright.207  This can be 
construed as de jure enclosure of the public domain.208  Even for those who resist 
the definition of the fees associated with paying public domains as taxes, a paying 
public domain results in the creation of an additional layer of protection 
surrounding specific goods.  Justifications for granting additional layers of 
protection should be evaluated in light of the principles that inform intellectual 
property and cast IP rights as mediators between situations of market failure and 
access to creative inputs freely available for reappropriation. 
In some developing countries with paying public domains, it is not 
unusual for the corresponding norms not to be enforced, a phenomenon that raises 
questions about the existence of any market failures that payment of a fee might 
cure.  If enforced, paying public domain provisions have the potential to generate a 
cultural gridlock economy,209 with chilling effects on every kind of creative 
industry, and affecting also semi-formalized non-industrial cultural manifestations. 
 
 205.Argentina introduced the domínio público pagante, also known as domínio público oneroso, in 
1958.  See Decreto Ley 1.224/58, B.O. 14/2/1958, art 6, (Arg.), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/ar/ar070es.pdf. 
 206. For example, Ghana, which subjects public domain works to the payment of a fee.  Copyright Act 
(Act No. 690) art. 38(3) (2005). 
 207. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 
SPG L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003). 
 208. Id. 
 209. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS 
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION AND COSTS LIVES (2008) (discussing the broader gridlock effects that 
an excessive intellectual property rights can generate). 
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The World Intellectual Property Organization has offered an analogy on 
this topic, likening paying public domains to compulsory licenses: 
Under a system of domaine public payant, or “paying public domain,” a 
fee is imposed for the use of works in the public domain.  Generally, the 
system works like a compulsory license:  the use is conditioned on 
payment of the prescribed fee but not upon the securing of a prior 
authorization.  The public domain to which such a regime applies is 
usually only composed of works the copyright of which has expired 
(except in countries applying it to expressions of folklore, as further 
detailed below).  In some countries, only the commercial or for-profit 
exploitation of public domain material is subject to payment.210 
If, as WIPO points out, a paying public domain is the equivalent of a generalized 
system of compulsory licensing, then adopters of these regimes should ask 
themselves if that is the economic and philosophical blueprint that they wish to 
imprint on their culture and society.  Compulsory licensing is a remedial means of 
accessing intellectual property goods, not a generalized tax on unprotected works.  
There is no legal or practical reason that would prevent a transition from the 
current system into a truly open public domain.  For instance, Chile switched in 
1992 from a paying public domain regime for folklore to a public domain proper, 
and there have been no reports of adverse effects on the vitality of Chilean folklore 
music.211 
This article therefore argues that countries that currently codify paying 
public domains should consider their removal.  Even if paying public domains 
were the equivalent of a generalized system of compulsory licensing (which they 
 
 210. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Note on the Meanings of the Term “Public 
Domain” in the Intellectual Property System With Special Reference to the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions/Expressions of Folklore, at 12, ¶ 54, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17/INF/8 (Nov. 24, 2010). 
 211. See Severine Dusollier, WIPO, Scoping Study on Copyright and Related Rights and the Public 
Domain, CDIP/7/INF/2 (Mar. 4, 2011). 
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are not) legislators and policymakers in these countries should ponder whether this 
potential cultural gridlock is a model they wish to imprint on their societies. 
7. Reconsideration of Moral Rights 
This is a residual suggestion, but one that is allowed by international 
intellectual property law and that could expedite transformative uses of 
copyrighted works throughout the developing world. 
Moral rights were first protected internationally by the Berne 
Convention212 in 1886,213 but common law countries resisted the idea of moral 
rights for a long time.214  In the case of the United States, Article 6bis of Berne was 
one of the main points of contention that prevented the country from ratifying 
Berne for over a century, until 1988.215  In 1994, the TRIPS Agreement, which 
incorporates Berne by reference in Article 9.1, expressly excluded moral rights 
from its scope of protection.216  To this day, while protection for moral rights is not 
 
 212. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 
U.N.T.S. 221 (stating  
(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said 
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the 
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.  (2) The rights granted to 
the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at 
least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or 
institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.  
However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or 
accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the death of the author of all 
the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after 
his death, cease to be maintained.  (3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights 
granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is 
claimed.). 
 213. See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Rights: A Study In The Law Of Artists, Authors, and 
Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV., 554 (1940); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ 
Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1997). 
 214. See Jane Ginsburg, Moral Rights in a Common Law System, 4 ENT. L. R., 122 (1990); Justin 
Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659 (2007). 
 215. Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
 216. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 9.1 (“Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of 
the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However, Members shall not have rights or 
obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under Article 6bis of that 
Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.”). 
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entirely absent from common law jurisdictions,217 they remain primarily associated 
with droit d’auteur countries, both theoretically and in practice. 
Criticism of moral rights stresses the fact that the concept of moral rights 
hinges on a misleading construct: that the works protected by exclusive 
monopolies somehow embody or display certain elements of the personality of the 
author, and therefore it is necessary to further extend the protection afforded by the 
economic core of the monopoly to encompass rights of attribution, integrity and 
others.218  Nevertheless, there is still a widespread belief that moral rights, by 
virtue of protecting authors qua authors, protect art and culture in itself, a view that 
is often also endorsed in common law countries.219 
In recent years, there have been attempts to frame strong moral rights 
regimes as crucial balancing mechanisms in the digital world.220  Some scholars 
suggest that this balancing function of moral rights can better equip developing 
countries to incentivize creativity in the digital copyright era.221  While it is not 
within the scope of this work to contribute to the discussion surrounding the 
broader question of the usefulness of moral rights, this article submits that 
 
 217. Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990) (In the United States, for instance, VARA was 
passed in 1990 to regulate the rights of attribution and integrity in “works of visual art.”).  
 218. See Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV., 263, 269 (2009). 
 219. Id. at 264 (“Moral rights scholarship is startling in its uniformity. Scholars take it as gospel that 
moral rights are crucial for art to flourish and that, if anything, we need a more robust moral rights 
doctrine.  Commentators routinely lament the gap between our modest American moral rights laws and 
the more expansive European ones.  In contrast to copyright law, which has produced a vibrant body of 
scholarship critical of the law’s excesses, the main scholarly criticism of moral rights is that they do not 
reach far enough.”).  Elsewhere, proposals to incorporate moral rights qua tale into common law 
normative frameworks have invariably failed.  Monica Kilian, A Hollow Victory for the Common Law? 
TRIPs and the Moral Rights Exclusion, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 321, 335-36 (2003) 
(proposing that moral rights be treated as an extension of the economic rights of the author as a way of 
incorporating them into common law discourse). 
 220. See, e.g., MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND NEW 
TECHNOLOGY (2011). 
 221. See Mira T. Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights in Developing Countries, 8 J. INT’L INTELL. PROP. RTS., 
357, 358 (2003) (“The trend towards lower levels of protection for moral rights, a characteristic feature 
of copyright reform around the world, is an entirely negative one. Moral rights have much to contribute 
to culture and creativity in developing countries”). 
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developing countries with emerging “copyright-intensive” industries should 
reconsider their approach to moral rights. 
Current copyright regimes establish strong moral rights frameworks 
throughout the developing world.222  The economic and social advantages of the 
existence of this kind of rights in places like Africa, for instance, have yet to be 
determined.  Beyond any problems that might affect theoretical justifications of 
moral rights, there are drawbacks to protecting moral rights.  They add yet another 
layer of rights to protected works, which might translate into heightened 
transaction costs for second-comers wishing to make transformative uses of those 
works.  Also, they increase legal uncertainty throughout the developing world, as 
the body of law governing the application of moral rights clauses to specific 
situations is not entirely clear,223 and is far less developed than the one we find in 
Europe. 
In an age where the concept of reappropriation in cultural production is 
increasingly blurred,224 eliminating moral rights could expedite transformative uses 
of these works by trimming down thickets of rights and reducing legal uncertainty.  
Countries where copyright industries make (or are expected to make) strong 
contributions to the local or national economy should consider suppressing moral 
rights in their intellectual property laws. 
 
 222. See ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT 319 (Chris Armstrong et. al. 
eds., 2010). 
 223. See Andrew Rens, No Answers: Butcher Boys, Artistic Freedom and Moral Rights, EX AFRICA 
SEMPER ALIQUID NOVI, (Feb. 17, 2012), http://aliquidnovi.org/no-answers-butcher-boys-artistic-
freedom-and-moral-rights/. 
 224. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY 
(2008). 
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In a way, the American experience with protection of moral rights in 
visual art through the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”)225 illustrates the 
viability of circumscribed applications of moral rights.  In the United States, a 
historical antagonist of moral rights doctrine, ad hoc protection was conferred to a 
specific category of work.226  This indicates that not all copyrighted works need to 
be given the same levels of protection.  Conversely, developing countries, long-
time importers of moral rights frameworks, may come to discover that certain 
industries can thrive without some of the entitlements they had before. 
As stated above, protection of moral rights is neither prohibited nor 
mandated by international intellectual property law.  Cultural and legal 
heritages,227 social perceptions attached to the concept of morality, resistance to 
change and pressure from proponents of expansive intellectual property regimes 
might prevent developing economies from considering eliminating moral rights, 
even in specific areas.  A lesser alternative for countries with perpetual moral 
rights that cannot be waived or assigned would be to reduce the duration of the 
rights, as well as allowing for waivers and assignments. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Regional cooperation among developing countries—most recently, in the 
form of the BRICS Intellectual Property Offices Cooperation Roadmap—is poised 
to focus primarily on patent law and policy, as well as on patent-flavored TRIPS 
 
 225. Visual Artists Rights Act § 106A . 
 226. See Edward J. Damich, A Comparison of State and Federal Moral Rights Protection: Are Artists 
Better Off after VARA, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 953 (1993). 
 227. DEERE, supra note 56, at 37-63. 
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flexibilities.  Yet, there are other areas of intellectual property in which South-
South debate and exchanges have been consistently overlooked. 
TRIPS is a minimum standards agreement with ample normative space 
for countries in the Global South to incorporate provisions that foster their 
domestic interests beyond the sphere of patent regulation.  This article surveys a 
set of TRIPS-compatible measures which, if adopted, would contribute to the 
advancement of innovation and development agendas in the South without 
increasing the overall levels of intellectual property protection. 
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